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How safe are our hospitals?
Mary Seddon and Alan Merry
In this edition of the Journal, Davis et al publish the
results of their study into adverse events in New Zealand
hospitals.1 The results – 12.9% of
admissions were associated with an adverse event – are again guaranteed to
produce headlines. When the same group published details of their regional
study, the New Zealand Herald ran the
story under the headline, “Blunders kill hundreds in
hospitals”.2 Is this a valid response?
The answer would appear to be yes, and no.
Studies in several healthcare systems have shown that sick
patients – admitted to hospitals, receiving multifaceted medical
management in complex systems of care – are vulnerable to adverse events
and harm. It would have been surprising if the New Zealand study had not also
found this. The problem was demonstrated more than ten years ago in a landmark
study of 30 000 medical records in New York State (3.7% of hospitalisations were
associated with an adverse event),3 and has
been confirmed subsequently in Australia
(16.6%)4 and Britain
(10.8%).5
But do these bald figures represent the whole story? The
number of adverse events associated with death in the NZ study (~1 in 320
hospital admissions) is a case in point. Before we become too alarmed, the
clinical context and the underlying prognosis of the patients should be taken
into account. In an American study, 6% of 111 acute care patient deaths were
found to be “definitely or probably
preventable.”6 However, after considering
the prognosis, and adjusting for the variability and skewness of the
observers’ ratings, it was estimated that only 0.5% of the patients whose
deaths were even possibly preventable would have lived three months or more in
good health if care had been optimal. This represented 1 patient per 10 000
admissions. The preventable proportion of deaths in the New Zealand study is not
clear.
It is only the
preventable adverse events that a better health/hospital system can improve
upon.
Buried at the end of the discussion section of Davis et
al’s paper, is the statement that “6.3 % of admissions in New
Zealand public hospitals were associated with adverse events that were both
preventable and occurred in hospital.” This figure is roughly half the
12.9% figure quoted in the abstract, and yet in terms of accuracy and quality
improvement, this is the more important one. (Davis et al’s second paper,
entitled “Adverse events in New Zealand public hospitals II:
preventability and clinical context,” was not available at the time of
writing this editorial.)
Direct comparisons of adverse event occurrences between
countries are unreliable because of differences in study methodologies and the
healthcare systems under review. In addition, the subjectivity of chart review
and retrospective judgements about the quality of care creates considerable
scope for variability in results. Inter-observer agreement (or lack of it) is a
key issue. Indeed Hayward’s study reported that if one reviewer rated
death as “definitely or probably preventable,” the probability that
the next reviewer would hold the opposite view (18%), was actually higher than
the probability that he would agree (16%).6 The
“kappa” statistic compares the actual agreement between observers
with the agreement that might be expected by chance alone. In the Davis study,
the authors quite properly draw attention to the fact that the kappa value in
their study (0.47) indicates only moderate agreement between the medical officer
reviewers and the expert reviewers (the level of agreement between the medical
reviewers and the nursing reviewers is not reported). However, the
interpretation of kappa depends on the underlying frequency of the events being
studied, and on the way in which it is
calculated.7 This is not explained in the Davis
paper, in which the kappa is first mentioned in the discussion, and not in the
methods or results section. This is not the only aspect of the paper that is
difficult to understand from the material presented – more detail on a
number of methodological issues would have been helpful.
A further point is that ‘safety’ is only one
(albeit important) dimension of healthcare quality. Others, such as
‘effectiveness’, may in fact improve patient outcomes more than an
excessive focus on reducing adverse events. Effective or appropriate care means
avoiding overuse (providing ineffective care, in which the benefits are
outweighed by the risks) and underuse (not providing effective
care).8 Underuse is a particular problem in New
Zealand as evidenced by the rationing of the provision of effective treatments
such as coronary artery bypass surgery.9
‘Access’, encompassing acceptability, timeliness, affordability, and
equity is another important dimension of quality; it is not much use having safe
care if patients are unable to access it. ‘Patient-focused’ care is
increasingly seen as a defining dimension of
quality,10 and involving patients in decisions
is likely to improve their safety. The Davis paper did not appear to measure
patient safety in relation to appropriateness of, or access to,
healthcare.
The magnitude of the problem of adverse events may be open
to debate, but the fact that it is substantial is not. Where do we go from here?
There is a balance that must be struck between putting resources into improving
the capture of adverse events with better reporting systems (reactive approach),
and putting them into strategies to address known risk areas (proactive
approach). Improving patient safety in our hospitals requires the direction of
much more effort into the latter option.
Drug prescribing and administration is known to be a
high-risk area. Several solutions have been tested and shown to be effective.
These include the provision of clinical pharmacists on ward rounds; computerised
physician order entry (CPOE) linked to patient data; palm pilots loaded with
drug reference guides; and bar coding on patient bracelets and drug
administration sheets. The reductions (up to 90%) in adverse drug events through
initiatives such as these have been
dramatic.11–13 And yet in New Zealand,
very few hospitals have enough clinical pharmacists to attend ward rounds, no
hospital has invested in a CPOE prescribing system, and only a few have trialled
a limited system of electronic drug administration. Instead, we rely on
exhorting hospital staff to try harder not to make mistakes.
The work on human error by James Reason demonstrates the
fallacy of this approach.14 It is part of the
human condition to make errors; therefore systems must be designed to reduce the
likelihood of errors, and to limit the impact on patients of those errors that
(inevitably) still occur. A culture of safety, in which errors can be admitted
without fear of blame or retribution, and in which everyone is responsible for
highlighting clinical quality risk situations, is fundamental to the improvement
of safety.15 It is disappointing, therefore,
that the Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Bill (currently before the
Select Committee), seems to go against current thinking on how to improve the
quality of patient care, with its emphasis on individuals rather than on teams
and systems. Indeed, Clause 51 specifically excludes protection for participants
in sentinel event investigations. It is hard to see how we can learn from and
improve our system failures if individuals are scared of coming
forward.
The Davis study was
expensive,16 and difficult to carry out. Did we
need it? It should not have been necessary to provide local data to convince
funding authorities of the intuitively obvious fact that the problem of
iatrogenic harm in New Zealand was similar to that found elsewhere, and was
worth addressing. Regrettably, in reality it probably was. It is, however,
disappointing, that the opportunity to go beyond the previous studies – to
extend the scope in terms of putting the adverse events into context and looking
at solutions – does not seem to have been taken.
The title of this editorial asks the question, how safe are
our hospitals? Notwithstanding its limitations, this study, (like previous
overseas studies) provides an answer – not safe enough. It is futile to
carry out research of this type in the absence of a commitment to respond to its
findings. These local data should provide a catalyst for greater investment in
patient safety and quality improvement in our hospitals. The onus is now firmly
on the Government, its Ministry of Health, its DHBs, and indeed all those who
work in healthcare, to respond to the challenge, and to make our healthcare
system one which, in the words of our Minister of Health’s New Zealand
Health Strategy,17 “all New Zealanders
can trust”.
Author information:
Mary Seddon, Head of Quality, Medicine and Acute Care, Middlemore Hospital,
Auckland, and Member of the Effective Practice Informatics and Quality (EPIQ)
Group, Department of Community Health, School of Medicine, Auckland; Alan Merry,
Department of Anaesthesiology, School of Medicine, Auckland
Conflict of
interest: Professor Alan Merry has financial interests in improving
safety in healthcare.
Correspondence: Dr
Mary Seddon, Middlemore Hospital, Private Bag 93311, Otahuhu, Auckland. Fax:
(09) 276 0282; email: MZSeddon@middlemore.co.nz
References:
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